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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
proof of wrongful intent. 61 An awareness of the misdemeanor was claimed to be
a prerequisite to conviction for misdemeanor-manslaughter, and the unlawful act
unaccompanied by culpable negligence (which is a question of fact involving
notice and intent) would not support a conviction.0 2 The dissent seems to take
the more realistic view of the problem, since the implications which the majority
raise open possibilities for wholesale mansaughter convictions.
Husband and Wife Larceny
The novel question of whether a husband could be guilty of larceny for
appropriating the separate property of his wife was presented in People v.Morton. 3 The Court held that the various Married Women acts6 4 have so changed the
legal status of a wife that her husband can be adjudged guilty of larceny, without
any corresponding change in the Penal Law. The court stressed the statutes which
have enfranchised married women and have abrogated the common law concept
of unity of marriage. To make the protection complete, the wife should be allowed
to prosecute her husband when he steals her property. The defendant's argument
that legislative action is required to bring about such a drastic change was dismissed; the larceny laws could not apply to this situation before the Married
Women acts, since the wife's property was not considered the property of
"another." 65
The erasure of the last vestige of the fiction of the unity of marriage logically
follows the Women's Emancipation statutes. 66 The only criticism of this decision
might be that this defendant was not forewarned. This is of little force, as the
husband's taking must have been larcenous ab initio or no conviction could have
been had. Therefore his protestations of moral blamelessness should be of little
weight.
61.
62.

See People v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237, 243, 77 N. E. 6, 8 (1906).
N. Y. PENAL LAW §1052 (3): "Such homicide is manslaughter in the

second degree, when committed without a design to effect death:
any

. . .

culpable negligence.

. .

which ..

.

does not constitute ...

. .

. 3) By

manslaughter

In the first degree ...."
63. 308 N. Y. 96, 123 N. E. 2d 790 (1954).
64. N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW §50 ("Property . . . owned by a married woman
shall continue to be her sole and separate property as if she were unmarried,
and shall not be subject to her husband's control . _"); §51 ("A married woman
has all the rights in respect to pproperty ... as if she were unmarried .... ");.
§57 ("A married woman has a right of action for an injury to her.., property
S.. as if unmarried.")
65. N. Y. PENAL LAW §1290.
66. DICKENS, OLIvER TwisT, ch. 51 (with reference to the presumed unity
of husband and wife); "If the law supposes that," ai4 Mr. Bumble, "the law
is an ass.")

